Comments

UNCLOS III: LAST CHANCE FOR
LANDLOCKED STATES?

INTRODUCTION

As world population increases and land-based resources continue
to diminish, the right to traverse the sea and exploit its resources
is becoming economically critical to all nations. Access to the sea
and its wealth is at least as important for landlocked States1
(LLS) as it is for coastal States. Historically, LLS have not been
accorded any substantially enforceable rights to traverse or exploit
the oceans. 2 However, representatives from these States are mak1. LLS include Andorra, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Switzerland, San Marino, and the Vatican City in Europe; Afganistan, Bhutan, Laos, Mongolia, Nepal, and Sikkim in Asia; Bolivia and Paraguay in South America; and Botswana, Burundi, Central African
Republic, Chad, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Rhodesia, Rwanda, Swaziland, Uganda, Upper Volta, and Zambia in Africa. See Alexander & Hodgson, The Role of the GeographicallyDisadvantagedStates in the Law of the
Sea, 13 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 558, 562 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Alexander
&Hodgson].
LLS comprise approximately one-fifth of the nations of the world. Note,
The Interests of Land-Locked States in the Law of the Sea, 9 SAN DIEGo
L. REV. 701, 702 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Note]. Yet they comprise only
8Y2% of the land area and 4% of the population of the world. H. KNIGHT,
THE LAW OF Tma SEA: CASEs, DOCUmENTS AND REaDINGS 380 (1975).
2. In theory, justification for permitting LLS to traverse adjacent
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ing demands at the Third United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III)3 which reflect a serious determination to acquire valuable rights through international law.
UNCLOS III, with its goal of providing a comprehensive body of
law governing the uses of the ocean, is proceeding under the declared policy that the seabed area of the ocean 4 is a "common heritage of mankind." 5 This policy affords LLS an opportunity to attain legally recognized rights not available through bilateral
agreements with coastal States. 6
The Revised Single Negotiating Text (RSNT), a series of draft
articles which has grown out of the UNCLOS III sessions and which
provides a basis for the current negotiations, includes several provisions beneficial to LLS.
Of particular importance are those
provisions pertaining to resources of the seabed area., Several
proposals giving LLS rights within the exclusive economic zones
(EEZ)9 of coastal nations have also been raised, though not
incorporated into the RSNT.10 The crucial question, however, centers on the prospects for adopting such a body of law. Political
and economic concerns may very well block the adoption of many
provisions of the RSNT. 11 As UNCLOS III sessions continue
coastal States to reach the sea has been found in principles of natural law,
freedom of the seas, and public law servitudes. Glassner, The Status of
Developing Land-Locked States Since 1965, 5 LAw. AMERICAS 480, 482

(1973); Question of Free Access to the Sea by Land-Locked Countries,
Memorandum by the United Nations Secretariat, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/29,

reprintedin I UNCLOS I, OFCICAL RECORDS 310-12 (1958).

In practice, how-

ever, their rights are customarily dependent upon agreements with coastal
States and enforceable at the coastal State's discretion. See Note, supra
note 1, at 703-04. See also Makil, Transit Rights of Land-Locked Countries, 4 J. WORLD TRADE 35, 35-36 (1970).
3. UNCLOS III has completed five substantive sessions: the first, December 3-15, 1973, in New York; the second, June 20-August 29, 1974, in
Caracas; the third, March 17-May 9, 1975, in Geneva; the fourth, March
15-May 7, 1976, in New York; and the fifth, August 2-September 18, 1976 in
New York. III, IV, V, & VI UNCLOS III Official Records (1974-1977). A
sixth session is scheduled to convene in the spring of 1977. L.A. Times,
Sept. 18, 1976, pt. I, at 9, col. 5.
4. The seabed area is defined as that part of the ocean "beyond the
limits of national jurisdiction." The Revised Single Negotiating Text, U.N.
Doc. A/Conf. 62/WP. 8/Rev. 1/pt. 1, art. 2(1) (1976) [hereinafter cited as
RSNT]. See text accompanying notes 27-31 infra.
5. RSNT, supranote 4, pt. 1, art. 3.
6. See text accompanying notes 64-74 infra.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. For a definition of the exclusive economic zone, see text accompanying notes 27-31 infra. See also RSNT, supra note 4, pt. 2, art. 44.
10. See text accompanying notes 88-91 and 96-97 infra.

11. See text accompanying notes 118-25 infra.
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without agreement, 1 2 States are increasingly taking unilateral
action to claim expansive EEZ's. 1 3

If LLS do not gain enforceable rights through UNCLOS III, each
will have to negotiate with other States on an individual basis
for these rights. In the past landlocked States have had to rely
on bilateral or regional agreements with neighboring coastal States
in order to gain access to the sea.14 Such agreements have proved
unsatisfactory for the majority of LLS because of their lack of
political and economic leverage.' 5
A determination of whether LLS will share in the wealth of the
sea requires an examination of both the provisions of the RSNT
and the political climate surrounding UNCLOS III. No matter how
desirable certain sections of the RSNT may be, there will be no
benefit to LLS unless they are adopted. As economic pressures
force more nations to unilaterally adopt expanded EEZ's, the likelihood that the provisions of the RSNT will be adopted decreases.
UNCLOS III may be landlocked States' last chance to gain meaningful access to the sea.
PROBLEMS OF LANDLOCKED STATES

The degree to which landlocked States are disadvantaged with
respect to the sea varies greatly. In Europe LLS are developed
and have access to the seaports of neighboring coastal States
through navigable rivers or joint transportation systems. 16 In
Africa, however, LLS are economically poor, politically new, and
lacking developed transportation systems.' 7 Yet to some degree all
LLS are disadvantaged because they lack seaports and are unable
8
to claim jurisdiction over the resources of the continental shelf.'
Historically LLS have sought two important objectives: physical
access to the sea and the right to extract resources from the sea.' 9
12. See L.A. Times, Sept. 18, 1976, pt. I, at 9, col. 5.
13. See note 36 infra.
14. See Note, supranote 1, at 703-06.
15. Id.
16. Alexander & Hodgson, supranote 1, at 575.
17. Id. at 576. All LLS in Africa gained their independence in the 1960's.
18. For a detailed discussion of degrees of disadvantage among LLS, see
Alexander &Hodgson, supra note 1.
19. Some authorities note that the two objectives are closely linked. One
writer has stated that access to the sea derives in one sense from freedom
of the seas. Glassner, supra note 2, at 482.

Because the sea has always been an important avenue of commerce,
the first objective received the greatest emphasis prior to UNCLOS
Ill. LLS have faced a dual obstacle in reaching the sea for trading
purposes: overland distance, which makes exporting costly and
burdensome; 20 and the potential or actual hostility of coastal
States.2 1 Although cooperative transit agreements are common between LLS and coastal States, LLS have no way to enforce the
right of access. 22 From these agreements LLS gain little more than
23
concessions which coastal States are free to rescind or restrict.
Customary and codified international law have recognized access
rights for LLS 24 but have not required coastal States to respect
25

such rights.
LLS' quest for access to a seaport has not been a major area of
controversy at UNCLOS III. The reason for this situation is not
the lack of importance of ocean access to LLS, but rather the
of the natural resource problem for the rest of
overriding urgency
26
the world.
In approaching the subject of resources, UNCLOS III negotiations
have distinguished the ocean resources found on and above the
continental shelf area 27 from those found in the central or deepseabed areas of the ocean. This distinction is due partly to the
increasing practice of coastal States of claiming exclusive control
over resources located within 200 miles from shore. 28 The other basis
for distinction is that the mineral resources of the deep seabed have
not been exploited commercially. At present, only a handful of
20. Note, supra note 1, at 704-06.
21. Id. An example of a political barrier arose when Rhodesia unilaterally declared its independence in 1965. Resultant United Nations sanctions
produced a severe petroleum shortage for Zambia, which had depended for
its imports upon a joint transportation system with Rhodesia.
22. Note, supra note 1, at 703-04.
23. Id.
24. See text accompanying notes 54-60 infra. See also Makil, Transit
Rights of Land-Locked Countries,4 J. WoRLD TRADE 35, 36 (1970).

25. The ambiguity in treaty provisions relating to access rights of LLS
drains these provisions of authority. Note, supra note 1, at 710.
26. See J. FoRRsTER, WORLD DYNAmCS (1971).
27. The continental shelf is defined as the
seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond
[the coastal State's] territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines from
which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured where the outer
edge of the continental margin does not extend up to that distance.
RSNT, supra note 4, pt. 2, art. 64.
28. See note 39 and text accompanying notes 83-87 and 92-94 infra. See
also RSNT, supranote 4, pt. 2, arts. 44-63.
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nations possesses the advanced technological skills necessary to tap
such resources. 29 However, the continental shelf and its superjacent waters contain hydrocarbons, minerals, most species of
fish, 30 and marine mammals, 31 all of which possess present
economic value.
LLS are disadvantaged with respect to both the seabed resources
and the continental shelf resources (EEZ resources). No LLS
presently possesses the technology necessary to tap the assets of
the deep seabed.3 2 A real threat exists that these minerals, viewed
by many as a valuable future supply, 33 will be exploited exclusively
by powerful coastal States. Because the economies of some of the
LLS depend upon mineral exporting, they could be adversely
affected by the future impact of seabed minerals on the world
34
market.
In furtherance of the concept that the seabed area is a "common
heritage of mankind," the RSNT contains provisions which would
ensure that all States share in the revenues from mineral mining
of the seabed. 35 However, these provisions have created the greatest
amount of controversy at UNCLOS III because of their restrictive
effect upon advanced coastal States.30 They are not likely to be
37
accepted in their present form.
LLS are totally disadvantaged with respect to the resources
within the EEZ's of coastal States. The provisions of the RSNT
give each coastal State complete discretion in determining the
29. See Glassner, The Illusory Treasure of Davy Jones' Locker, 13 SAN
L. REV. 533, 537 (1976).
30. See provisions of RSNT, supra note 4, pt. 2, arts. 50-57.
31. Id. art. 54.
32. Only European LLS are developed. See Alexander &Hodgson, supra
note 1, at 561. European LLS, however, have not developed deep-seabed
technology.
33. See generally Glassner, supra note 29.
34. It is difficult to determine the actual future impact of marine mineral
resources on the world market. LLS which export minerals may nevertheless find overland transportation cost prohibitive if prices fall. See Economic Implications of Sea-bed Mineral Development in the International
Area, Report by The Secretary-General, reprinted in I UNCLOS III, OFFESee also Note, supra note
CIAL RECORDS 4, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/25 (1974).
1, at 719-22.
35. See text accompanying notes 63-75 infra.
36. See text accompanying notes 119-23 infra.
37. See text accompanying notes 118-23 infra.
DIEGO

disposition of resources within its EEZ.38 Further, without waiting
for UNCLOS III to reach a settlement, several States have unilaterally claimed control over resources in their EEZ's 39 with the
result that other States are pressured to do the same. 40 Although
the trend toward unilateral action has been denounced as a threat
to UNCLOS III negotiations, 4 1 there is little question that this trend
42
will continue to gain momentum.
CONFERENCES PRIOR TO

UNCLOS III

The existing law of the sea consists chiefly of custom, bilateral
and multilateral agreements, and the four conventions of the First
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (the Geneva
Conference) .4 3 Although the 1958 Geneva Conference was the
first attempt to create a coherent and codified body of law of the
sea, the four Geneva Conventions are mainly a codification of
customary law and are based on principles of laissez-faire.4 Because customary law had given LLS no actual rights, and because
few developing LLS were independent in 1958, 45 the Geneva Con46
ventions did not enhance the status of LLS.
38. RSNT, supra note 4, pt. 2, arts. 50-52.
39. For example, the United States Congress recently passed a bill providing exclusive jurisdiction over all fish, except highly migratory species,
within 200 miles of shore. Fishery Conservation and Management Act of
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-265, 90 Stat. 331 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-82 (Supp.
2, 1976)) (effective Mar. 1, 1977). Under the provisions of this act, foreign
vessels may engage in fishing pursuant to international fishery agreements
if the vessels have on board a permit issued by the Secretary of State.
Norway's decision to establish an economic zone prompted other common
market nations to do the same. See L.A. Times, Oct. 17, 1976, pt. IV, at 1,
col. 1. Iceland, a developing country with an economy highly dependent
upon the fishing industry, also extended its fishery limits to 200 miles. 8
U.N. MONTHLY CHRON., Jan. 1976, at 40.
40. See F. Noland, A Case for an International Regime for the Seabeds
51-52 (May 5, 1971) (unpublished M.A. thesis in University of San Diego
School of Law Library).
41. 8 U.N. MONTHLY CHRON., Jan. 1976, at 40.
42. See F. Noland, supra note 40.
43. Convention on the High Seas, done at Geneva, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T.
2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 45D U.N.T.S. 82; Convention on the Territorial Sea
and the Contiguous Zone, done at Geneva, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606,
T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205; Convention on the Continental Shelf,
done at Geneva, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S.
311 [hereinafter cited as Continental Shelf Convention]; Convention on
Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, done
at Geneva, Apr. 29, 1958, 17 U.S.T. 139, T.I.A.S. No. 5969, 559 U.N.T.S. 285.
44. THE TRImATmAL CoMm'N, A NEW REGIME FOR THE OC-ANS 12 (1975).
45. See note 17 supra.
46. See Neptune, May 1976, at 4, col. 2.
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The High Seas Convention gave all States the rights of navigation, fishing, laying cables, and overflight on the seas. 47 Although
these rights applied to non-coastal States, 48 the Convention placed
no duty upon coastal States to provide LLS access to the sea in order to exercise these rights. 49 The Fisheries Convention permitted
coastal States to regulate fishing near their shores for conservation
purposes. 50 No restriction was placed on fishing on the high seas,
except that previously existing regional arrangements were to be
honored. 51 The Continental Shelf Convention gave coastal States
the exclusive right to explore and exploit the natural resources of
the continental shelf. 2 The provisions of this Convention were
widely accepted and are similar to present provisions of the RSNT
53
pertaining to the 200-mile EEZ.
Although the Geneva Conference was the first large scale, multi54
lateral conference to recognize free access to the sea for LLS, it
47. Article 2 of the High Seas Convention provides:
The high seas being open to all nations, no State may validly
purport to subject any part of them to its sovereignty. Freedom
of the high seas ... comprises, inter alia, both for coastal and noncoastal States:
1) Freedom of navigation;
2) Freedom of fishing;
3) Freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines;
4) Freedom to fly over the high seas.
48. Id.
49. See note 55 infra.
50. Article 1 of the Fisheries Convention provides:
All States have the right for their nationals to engage in fishing
on the high seas, subject ... to the interests and rights of coastal
states as provided for in this convention.
Article 7 of the Fisheries Convention provides:
rA1 ny coastal State may, with a view to the maintenance of the
productivity of the living resources of the sea, adopt unilateral
measures of conservation . . . provided that negotiations to that effect with other States have not led to an agreement within six
months.
51. Article 6 of the Fisheries Convention provides, however, that the
coastal State has a "special interest in the maintenance of productivity of
the living resources in any area of the high seas adjacent to its territorial
sea." The area referred to here as the high seas would be commonly referred to today as the continental shelf area.
52. Continental Shelf Convention, supra note 43, art. 2.
53. Article 2(1) of the Continental Shelf Convention provides that "the
coastal State exercises over the continental shelf sovereign rights for the
purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources." See RSNT,
supra note 4, pt. 2, art. 44; note 92 infra.
54. Article 3 of the High Seas Convention provides that "in order to enjoy
the freedom of the seas on equal terms with coastal States, States having
no seacoast should have free access to the sea."

made no provision for the enforcement of such a right. Article
3 of the High Seas Convention specified only that the transit rights
of LLS would be subject to common agreement between landlocked
and coastal States.5 5 Therefore, although the Geneva Conventions
were an important step in codifying the existing law of the sea,
LLS did not derive any internationally recognized and enforceable
rights from the codification."6
The only other recent multilateral convention affecting the status
of LLS is the 1965 Convention on Transit Trade of Land-Locked
States. 57 At the time this Convention was created more LLS
existed than had in 1958, 58 and their demands were beginning to
find expression in international politics. However, the Convention
on Transit Trade dealt only with transit issues and made no
provisions relating to extraction of resources. Its provisions
resemble the Geneva transit provisions in that the rights of LLS
were made dependent upon bilateral agreements with coastal
States, 59 although one provision did establish arbitration procedures for the settlement of disputes arising from such bilateral
agreements.6 0 Existing law of the sea, therefore, provides virtually
no enforceable rights for LLS because so few restrictions are placed
on coastal States and because the rights given LLS in codified law
are qualified by wording which subjects these rights to the discretion of coastal States.
55. Article 3 continues to provide that "to this end States situated be-

tween the sea and a State having no seacoast shall by common agreement
with the latter and in conformity with existing international conventions
accord:
a) to the State having no seacoast, on a basis of reciprocity, free transit
through their territory." (emphasis added).
56. LLS were unsuccessful at Geneva despite their efforts in the years
preceding the Conference to draw the attention of the international community to their problems and needs. See PrinciplesEnunciated by the Preliminary Conference of Land-Locked States, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/C. 5/L. 1,
reprinted in VII UNCLOS I, OMCAL Rconns 67-79 (1958).
57. 19 U.S.T. 7383, T.I.A.S. No. 6592, 597 U.N.T.S. 42, done at New York
City, July 8, 1965, entered into force for the United States Nov. 28, 1968.
58. Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Rwanda, Upper Volta, and Zambia became independent between 1958 and 1965.
59. Article 2, paragraph 2 provides that "the rules governing the use of
means of transport, when they pass across part of the whole of the territory
of another Contracting State, shall be established by common agreement
among the ContractingStates concerned, with due regard to the multilateral
conventions to which these states are parties." (emphasis added)
60. Article 16 provides that in the case of a dispute between an LLS and
the adjoining coastal State, at the request of either, a commission will be
established to arbitrate the matter. The commission will be comprised of
one representative from each State and a third member acceptable to both
parties.
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UNCLOS

III AND

THE RSNT

The LLS at UNCLOS III have voiced two main concerns: first

that LLS be given affirmative, enforceable rights of access to the
sea and extraction of its resources; and second, that restrictions be
placed upon developed coastal States to prevent them from claiming
or depleting the existing resources. The LLS have been partially
successful. In contrast to the Geneva policy of laissez-faire,
UNCLOS III reflects a tendency toward restrictions on high seas
freedoms. The Conference is considering proposals pertaining to
deep-seabed mining, for example, which place restrictions on coastal
States to the benefit of LLS.61 The position of LLS is also enhanced by the use of the RSNT as the basis for negotiations at
UNCLOS III. While earlier UNCLOS III sessions had proceded
upon several alternative texts, later sessions adopted a single text
with the expectation that its provisions would be adopted in some
2
form as international law.

RSNT: Part 1
Part 1 of the RSNT proposes the implementation of a regime to
manage exploitation of the deep seabed. Although part 1 does not
represent the consensus of most UNCLOS III delegates, it is being
used as a basis of discussion in Committee 163 of the Conference.
The provisions contained in part 1 are advantageous to LLS because they impose restrictions on developed coastal States with
respect to deep-seabed mining. Developed States are presently
attaining the level of technology necessary for commercial production of deep-seabed minerals. LLS, however, are unable to
undertake exploitation and can receive no benefits from deepseabed mining unless an internationally supervised system of revenue sharing is adopted.
The basic premise underlying part 1 is that the resources of the
seabed area are the common heritage of mankind. 4 It proposes the
61. See text accompanying notes 64-75 infra.
62. 13 U.N. MONTHLY CHRON., June 1976, at 23-24.
63. For organizational purposes UNCLOS III is divided into three main
Committees. Committee I deals with implementation of the concept that
the resources of the international seabed beyond national jurisdiction are
to be used for the common benefit of mankind. Committee II covers general aspects of the law of the sea. Committee III deals with environment,
research, and technology. Id.
64. RSNT, supra note 4, pt. 1, art. 3.

establishment of an International Sea-bed Authority (ISA) empowered to supervise mining operations on the ocean floor.0 5 Part
1 authorizes the ISA to extract resources from the oceans for
the benefit of all States, whether developed or developing, landlocked or coastal.66 This authorization includes the right to contract with nations and private parties for both the extraction of
minerals and the conduct of scientific research. 7 The purpose of the
ISA is to foster the development of a world economy, a balanced
growth of international trade, and international cooperation.0 8
These provisions, if adopted, would result in LLS receiving a share
of the revenues from seabed mineral extraction.6 9 LLS would be
further benefitted by a provision giving the ISA the power to control the rate of mineral extraction in order to protect mineral exporting countries.7 0
Part I also empowers the ISA to conduct scientific research to
65. Id. art. 20, which also provides that "all States Parties to this Convention are ipso facto members of the Authority."
66. Id. art. 7.
67. Id. art. 10 provides:
1) Scientific research in the Area shall be carried out exclusively for the benefit of mankind as a whole. The Authority shall
promote and encourage the conduct of scientific research.
2) The Authority may itself conduct scientific research in the
Area and enter into agreements for that purpose.
Annex I of part I provides that:
Title to the minerals [recovered from the seabed area] shall normally be passed upon recovery of the minerals pursuant to a contract of exploration and exploitation .... The Authority shall en-

courage the conduct of prospecting in the Area. Prospecting shall
be conducted only after the Authority has received a satisfactory
written undertaking that the proposed prospector shall comply
with this Part of the Convention and the relevant rules and regulations of the Authority concerning protection of the marine environment, the transfer of data to the Authority, (and] the training of
personnel designated by the Authority ....

The proposed pros-

pector shall, together with the undertaking, notify the Authority
of the broad area or areas in which prospecting is to take place.
68. Id. art. 9, para. 1.
69. Id. art. 9, para. 6 provides that the Authority will "ensure equi-

table sharing in and distribution of financial and other economic bene-

fits among States Parties from the activities in the Area, taking into particular consideration the interests and needs of the developing countries
70. Id. art. 9, para. 4. This paragraph states that the Authority will
facilitate "through existing forums or such new arrangements as may
be appropriate ... the growth, efficiency and stability of markets for those
classes of commodities produced from the Area, at prices remunerative to
producers and fair to consumers" and that the Authority will limit "in
an interim period specified below, total production in the Area so as
not to exceed the projected cumulative growth segment of the nickel market
during that period" and that the Authority will establish "a compensatory system of economic adjustment assistance in respect of the adverse effects referred to in this paragraph."
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71
strengthen the technological capabilities of all developing States. '
The nationals of these developing States would receive training and
employment under the auspices of the ISA.7 2 The ISA would make
the results of research and analysis available to all nations.7 3 Part 1
specifically provides that developing LLS be given "effective
participation" in the scientific activities sponsored by the ISA, with
regard to their needs in "overcoming obstacles arising from their
disadvantaged location." 7 4 Although proceeds from mining would
directly benefit developing LLS, it is unlikely that these States

would benefit from results of scientific research.7 5
Two proposals have been submitted to Committee I by UNCLOS
III delegates for consideration as alternatives to the provisions of
the RSNT. One delegate has proposed that certain sectors of the seabed be subject to a separate regime in which States might autonomously extract minerals, with the ISA role relegated to one of general supervision.7 6 Another delegate has suggested that applicants
for mining contracts propose to the ISA two alternative mining
areas of equivalent value.7 7 The ISA would select the site for exploitation at its own discretion.78 This approach would benefit the
ISA by providing it with ocean data otherwise too difficult or
expensive to obtain.7 9
The representatives of many LLS oppose the proposals, however,
because they favor the technologically developed nations with the

71. Id. art. 10, para. 3(b) (i).
72. Id. art. 10, para. 3 (b) (ii) & (iii).
73. Id. art. 10, para. 3 (c).
74. Id. art. 18.
75. Because of poor economies, most LLS are incapable of utilizing scientific research data. However, the present inability of LLS to utilize or participate in scientific research does not justify withholding from them these
results. This proposition is a logical extension of the theory that they
should be given rights to resource exploitation, even though they may not
have the present ability to exploit. See Glassner, Developing Land-Locked
States and the Resources of the Seabed, 11 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 633, 651
(1974).
76. IV UNCLOS III, OFFICLm REcoRDs 55, paras. 6-8 (1975).
77. Id. para. 9. Both proposals were treated in an informal document
produced by Committee I in response to various written proposals for joint
venture exploitation systems by the United States, the Group of 77, a group
of eight European States, Japan, and the Soviet Union. Id. at 55, para. 4.
78. Id. at 55, para. 9.
79. Id.

present means to undertake independent exploitation. 80 Such
developed nations would reap a disproportionate share of the ocean
profits. LLS also fear that the ISA might be prevented from freely
choosing the most advantageous methods of exploitation. 81
Both proposals provide some measure of autonomy for developed
nations, thus mitigating their concern over mineral dependency.
Accordingly, their inclusion would increase the likelihood that
the ISA would be adopted as international law. These proposals
would, however, make the ISA less beneficial to LLS, for the
superpowers would exercise greater control over deep-seabed mining operations. At best LLS would receive only technological
assistance and allocated funds from limited areas.8 2 Additionally,
the ISA's lack of control could lead to pollution and waste.
RSNT: Part2
The most significant part of the RSNT produced by Commitee
II establishes the right of coastal States to control designated
areas beyond their coastlines. Part 2 represents a distinct disadvantage to LLS because only coastal States are authorized by its
provisions to exercise jurisdiction over resources. LLS oppose the
provisions which formally establish a 200-mile EEZ. Although the
RSNT provides that LLS may participate in the extraction of living
resources83 in the EEZ's of adjoining coastal States, it does not provide LLS any rights to use the zones of non-adjoining States. 8 4
Thus, if a LLS adjoins a coastal State with a limited coastline or
a small continental shelf, the possibilities for extraction of living
resources are limited. Even though LLS have the right to fish
within the EEZ of adjoining coastal States, the right is qualified.
80. Id. at 56, para. 10.
81. Id. at 55, para. 8.
82. Developed coastal States are not opposed to sharing revenues from
mining with other States. Their chief concern is that the power of the
Authority would restrict their supply of minerals. The objective of the
United States regarding seabed mining has been expressed as "guaranteed nondiscriminatory access under reasonable conditions to the ocean's
seabed minerals beyond national jurisdiction." Status Report on Law of
the Sea Conference: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Minerals, Materials
and Fuels of the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. 1177 (1975). See also text accompanying notes 119-23 infra.
83. The RSNT distinguishes between living resources (fish, plants, and
marine mammals) and nonliving resources (oil and hard minerals). See
RSNT, supranote 4, pt. 2, art. 44(1) (a).
84. Id. pt. 2, art. '58(1). This section gives LLS no absolute rights with
respect to the exclusive economic zones of coastal States but provides that
"the terms and conditions of such participation shall be determined by
the States concerned through bilateral, subregional or regional agreements."
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The RSNT provides LLS access to fish in an adjoining State's EEZ
on an "equitable basis." 85 Representatives of LLS believe that the
term equitable basis disguises the right of the coastal State to
withhold all but the surplus catch of fish from LLS. 86 Because of
the discretion allotted coastal States in determining what shall
qualify as "surplus," it appears to LLS that coastal States are au87
thorized to withhold the entire stock of fish within their EEZ.
LLS have denounced the EEZ and have proposed regional sharing
arrangements which would give all States of the region the right
to extract EEZ resources on an equal basis. 88 Although the RSNT
provides that LLS may establish rights to EEZ resources independently through bilateral and multilateral agreements,8 9 representatives from LLS believe it would be more valuable to have such
rights established by UNCLOS III itself. LLS propose that they be
allocated a fixed percentage of the revenues from extraction of living and nonliving resources from the EEZ's of coastal States within
a designated region.90 Such regional sharing arrangements give
LLS the advantage of drawing upon the EEZ resources of several
coastal States, not just those with which they adjoin.9 1 Thus, they
would be confined neither to an EEZ that may be small or poor in
resources nor to fishing an arbitrary surplus.
Part 2 gives LLS no right to exploit nonliving resources9 2 within
the EEZ's. The RSNT provides that LLS shall partake in revenue
85. Id.
86. Neptune, May 1976, at 4, col. 2.
87. RSNT, supra note 4, pt. 2, arts. 50 and 51, delineate the rights of
coastal States with respect to resources in the economic zone. The coastal
State "shall ensure through proper conservation and management measures
that the maintenance of the living resources in the exclusive economic zone
is not endangered by over-exploitation." Id. art. 50, para. 2. "The coastal
State shall determine its capacity to harvest the living resources of the exclusive economic zone." Id. art. 51, para. 2. Such provisions appear to give
coastal States full discretion.
88. U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/C. 2/L. 39 (1974), reprinted in III UNCLOS III,
OMICIAL REcoRUs 216-17 (1974). Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, and the
Netherlands joined a group of landlocked States in submitting this proposal. See also U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/C. 2/L. 82, reprinted in III UNCLOS
III, OFFIciAL RECORDS 240 (1974).
89. RSNT, supra note 4, pt. 2, arts. 58(3) & 59.
90. U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/C. 2/L. 39 (1974), reprinted in III UNCLOS III,
OFFICIAL RECORDS 216-17 (1974).
91. Id.
92. RSNT, supra note 4, pt. 2, art. 44(a) gives the coastal State "sover-

sharing from extraction of continental shelf resources only beyond
200 milesY3 This provision is of no benefit to LLS because wellhead
oil production beyond 200 miles is undeveloped and may be delayed
indefinitely because of political and economic restrictions. 4 The
exploitation of other minerals beyond 200 miles is similarly undeveloped. 95
LLS have proposed that they be given a share of the oil revenues
within the 200-mile zone. One proposal provides for revenue
sharing from resources located beyond fifty miles from shore.9 0
Another proposal provides LLS and other geographically disadvantaged States with a small percentage of all revenues gained
from exploitation within the 200-mile EEZ and a larger percentage
of the revenues from outside the zone. 7 Such a system assures
LLS some revenues even if oil is never extracted from the continental shelf beyond 200 miles from shore.
RSNT: Part 3

From the viewpoint of LLS, the most significant part of the work
of Committee III deals with scientific research within the EEZ of
coastal States. 98 Although LLS may presently be unable to apply
the results of scientific research directly, such research affects them
indirectly because of its effects on future uses of the sea.
Part 3 of the RSNT recognizes the right of coastal States to
determine the manner in which scientific research is to be
eign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the bed and
subsoil and superjacent waters."
93. Id. art. 70 provides that "the coastal State shall make payments and
contributions in kind in respect of the exploitation of the non-living resources of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles. . .

."

Such pay-

ments are to be made to the International Authority. Id. para. 4.
94. Although technological innovations have made drilling for oil at great
depths possible, production costs will probably make deep-well drilling unfeasible during this century. F. Noland, A Case for an International Regime
for the Seabeds 25 (May 5, 1971) (unpublished M.A. thesis in University
of San Diego School of Law Library).
95. In areas where the continental shelf extends beyond 200 miles, mining is presently gaining momentum. See Glassner, The Illusory Treasure
of Davy Jones' Locker, 13 SAN DIEGo L. R.v. 533, 537 (1976).
96. Neptune, May 1976, at 4, col. 2. This proposal was made informally
by a group of landlocked and other geographically disadvantaged States
at the third UNCLOS III session.
97. Id. At the fourth session a representative from Singapore suggested
sharing 12% of the value of wellhead production within 200 miles from
shore and 24% of that produced beyond 200 miles.
98. RSNT, supra note 4, pt. 3, arts. 48-77.
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conducted within their EEZ's.9 9 Although LLS are provided the
right to participate in such research "whenever feasible,"'10 0 part 3
leaves such a determination to the discretion of the coastal State.
A coastal State may refuse any proposed project which it believes
detrimental to its security or economic interests. 01 '
To limit the extent of coastal State control, a proposal submitted
to Commitee III by nine socialist nations' 02 suggests distinguishing
between two types of scientific research: fundamental research,
which would be restricted only in the sense that coastal State interests must be respected; and resource-related research, over which
coastal States would retain sufficient control to protect their resources.1°3 Fundamental research includes all types of research
04
It
unrelated to the exploration and exploitation of resources.
includes research into natural phenomena and processes occurring
at the atmosphere-ocean interface, the study of the earth's crust
under the ocean, continental drifts, and vulcanism. 0 5 Coastal
States oppose such a compromise because the distinction between
fundamental and applied research 0 6 is often difficult to define and
because the distinction may result in applications which coastal
10 7
States consider dangerous and fallacious.
99. Id. arts. 57-61 provide:
Coastal States have the sovereign right to conduct and regulate
marine scientific research in their territorial sea. .-. . States and
competent international organizations which intend to undertake
scientific research in the economic zone or on the continental shelf
of a coastal State shall. . . provide the state with a full description
of [the research project] .... States and competent international
organizations when undertaking scientific research in the economic
zone or on the continental shelf of a coastal State shall comply with
the following conditions .... [They shall] ensure the rights of the
coastal State... to participate or be represented ....
[They
shall] [p]rovide the coastal State, at its request, with preliminary
reports ...
and the final results and conclusions ....
[They
shall undertake to provide access for the coastal State... to all
data and samples. The coastal State shall not withhold its consent
to the conduct of a marine scientific research project unless that
project . . .bears substantially upon the exploration and exploitation of the living or non-living resources . . . Fori unduly interferes with economic activities performed by the coastal State ....
100. Id. art. 66(2).
101. Id. art. 60.
102. U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/C. 3/L. 26 (1975), reprinted in Om
=CIA
REcoRDs, supra note 76, at 213.
103. OmcxAL REcoRDs, supra note 76, at 92, para. 32.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 98, paras. 32 & 40.
107. Id. at 97, para. 27.

RSNT:

PROSPECTS FOR ADOPTION

LLS cannot benefit from any provisions of the RSNT until it
is adopted in some form by UNCLOS III. Whereas in the past LLS

have been primarily dependent upon gratuitous concessions by
coastal States, changes in the political climate since 1958 have given
LLS more bargaining power in the world arena.10 8 Much of the
developing LLS' increased bargaining power derives from their
present alignment with the Group of 77. The Group of 77 was
formed by developing States for the purpose of pursuing a united
policy in United Nations negotiations. 00 Approximately two-thirds
of the States participating in UNCLOS III are members of the
Group of 77.110 Because conference votes are decided by a two-

thirds majority, the Group of 77 has the potential power to determine the outcome on all issues.""
Even though most of the developing States which comprise the
Group of 77 are coastal, alignment with the group is advantageous to LLS because almost all LLS are undeveloped to some
extent. 1 2 Both LLS and the other members of the Group of 77
share the need to obtain priorities in fund allocation from deepseabed mining. Both groups have an interest in receiving technological and scientific assistance. As a result of these shared interests, the Group of 77 has the potential to force a number of beneficial concessions for LLS.
However, alignment with the Group of 77 is unlikely to benefit
LLS with respect to the issue of establishing EEZ's for coastal
States. The right to control resources located within their EEZ's is
important to the majority of developing nations comprising the
Group of 77. Although some proposals submitted by the Group
of 77 have permitted LLS access to fish in the EEZ's of coastal
States, 113 these proposals have not included access to the more
valuable mineral resources.
There are other nations which, like LLS, are geographically disadvantaged with regard to the sea. These geographically disadvantaged nations include those States which border a small continental
shelf (shelf-locked) and States with narrow coastlines and small
108. See Charney, The International Regime for the Deep Seabed, 17
HARv. INV'L

L.J. 1 (1976).

109. The Group of 77 contains approximately 106 nations. Id. at 6.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Alexander & Hodgson, supra note 1, at 561. Sixteen LLS are included in the United Nations category of least developed States. 13 U.N.
MONTHLY CnozR., Jan. 1976, at 41.
113. See, e.g., U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/C. 2/L. 35, reprinted in III UNCLOS
III, OFFcIIA REcoRDs 213 (1974).
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EEZ's. 114 These nations do not share the access problem of LLS,
but because of their geographical configurations, they are likely to
support LLS on the issue of the establishment of regional economic
zones. Approximately one-third of the nations participating in
UNCLOS III are considered geographically disadvantaged and thus
have the potential power to block the conference vote on any
issue. 1 15

Despite the strength in numbers which LLS gain through
alignment with the Group of 77 and geographically disadvantaged
States, the coastal superpowers'" retain considerable power to
control the thrust of UNCLOS III negotiations. Beyond the economic, military, and political leverage possessed by the superpowers
exists the threat to abandon UNCLOS III altogether and pursue
unilateral policies. 17 Because neither LLS nor other developing
States possess the means to compete with the superpowers for ocean
resources, such unilateral actions would be disadvantageous for
both the Group of 77 and the geographically handicapped States.
The interplay of group politics and national interests produces
varying prospects for the adoption of those RSNT provisions which
are beneficial to LLS. Part 1 of the RSNT has prompted more
controversy in the UNCLOS III negotiations than Parts 2 and 3.
As the fifth session of UNCLOS III closed in September 1976,
there had been no substantial agreement on the seabed mining
issue." 58 Influenced by the oil embargo of 1973 and the subsequent
oil price increase by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries, representatives of the developed nations have expressed
concern about mineral dependency and want to preserve unrestricted access to mineral supplies. 119 Concern over the restrictive
114. Twenty-five States are listed as shelf-locked, and 32 States
have coastlines less than 200 miles in length. In addition to shelflocked States and States with limited coastlines, other types of geographically disadvantaged States include those with small continental margins and/or economic zones and even States with indications of limited resource potential in their prospective economic zones. All disadvantages are
relative, and many nations in the above groups are economically developed.
Alexander & Hodgson, supra note 1, at 563-65.
115. THE TRILATERAL COMM'N, A NEw REGIME FOR THE OCEANS 14 (1975).

(1975).
116. Notably the United States and the U.S.S.R.
117. Charney, supra note 108, at 7.
118. L.A. Times, Sept. 18, 1976, pt. I, at 9, col. 5.
119. Barkenbus, Nodule Mining Becomes Battleground for World Economic Struggle, NrPTuNE, March 1976, at 2, col. 4.

regulations proposed in Committee I prompted the United States
to begin exploitation unilaterally, despite a 1969 General Assembly
resolution recommending a moratorium on deep-seabed mining
pending international agreement. 1 20 The proposed Deep Seabed
Hard Minerals Act, 121 which provides that the United States may
begin to award contracts to private companies starting in 1977 if
no international convention is ratified, 22 further reflects United
States concern over restricted access to minerals. In 1975, a United
States company claimed the right to exploit a 60,000-square kilometer sector of the Pacific Ocean seabed for fifteen years. 123 At
least one negotiator at UNCLOS 111124 saw this claim as an attempt
to establish a priority right against both a future ISA and any other
State or organization which might want to exploit that sector
before the ISA is recognized. 12 5 The representatives of LLS have
expressed fear that such unilateral action will put pressure on the
negotiations; such pressure could result in compromises unfavorable to LLS or in a termination of the negotiations without settlement.
Part 2 of the RSNT, dealing with the establishment of EEZ's
for coastal States, will undoubtedly be adopted with provisions
primarily advantageous to coastal States. Although proposals have
been made which grant LLS rights within these zones, the proposals have commanded no significant support for several reasons. First, coastal States greatly outnumber LLS. Second, the
EEZ is virtually a fait accompli in international law. 12" Third, the
trend toward coastal States expanding their EEZ's to 200 miles is
likely to gain momentum as more coastal States bow to political
pressures. 1 27 Finally, coastal States are opposed to sharing EEZ
resources or the revenues from these resources with politically
hostile LLS. 12
Because of these factors, there is little hope that
120. G.A. Res. 2574D (XXIV) (1969), 9 INT'L LEGAL MATRnuALS 422
(1970).
121. H.R. 1270; S. 713, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. (1976).
122. The Act provides that U.S. nationals be required to obtain a license
from the Secretary of the Interior before engaging in the exploration and
exploitation of manganese nodules on the deep-seabed floor. Id.
123. Deepsea Ventures, Inc.: Notice of Discovery and Claim of Exclusive
Mining Rights, and Request for Diplomatic Protection and Protection of Investments, 14 INT'L LEGAL MATRIAL.s 51 (1974).
124. The Australian delegate, OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 76, at 54, para.
25.
125. Id.
126. See note 39 supra.
127. Id.
128. For example, the United States is unvilling to share oil revenues
with OPEC nations.
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UNCLOS III will accord LLS equal or substantial rights within
coastal States' EEZ's.
Part 3 of the RSNT, pertaining to scientific research, is likely
to follow international convention and grant coastal States the right
to restrict scientific operations within their EEZ's. Although delegates have criticized the degree of coastal State discretion in this
area, 129 the majority of States favor coastal State authority. Representatives of developing coastal States have expressed apprehension
about research operations which their nations would be powerless
to control. 130 The representative of one developing State has even
stated that his country views the freedom of scientific research as
the freedom of developed nations to implement aggressive policies. 131 For political and military reasons, the majority of developed
nations also prefer granting coastal States strong authority in the
32
area.
CONCLUSION

UNCLOS III has provided LLS with a unique forum to express
their need for enforceable rights to share in the use and exploitation

of the ocean.

The Conference has declared a policy of treating

seabed resources as the heritage of all nations. Nevertheless, it is

likely that economic and political pressures will prevent the Conference from adopting any provisions which substantially benefit LLS.
Parts 2 and 3 of the RSNT, rather than adding to the rights of

LLS, continue to endorse the broad authority of coastal States.
In fact, the provisions of the EEZ contained in Part 2 represent a
disadvantage to LLS compared to the less restrictive provisions of

the Geneva Continental Shelf Convention.
Because of their lack of political, economic, and military leverage,
many LLS are dependent upon potential worldwide agreement to
attain enforceable rights with respect to the sea. The probable
failure of UNCLOS III to accord such rights will foreclose these
nations' last chance to partake in the common heritage of mankind.
SUSAN FERGUSON
129. See OFFICIAL

RECORDS,

supra note 76, at 92.

130. Id. para. 33.

131. Id. at 99, paras. 48, 49. According to an Albanian delegate, "the conduct of scientific research within a coastal state's area of sovereignty is
a matter directly affecting its freedom and independence and should therefore rest exclusively within its jurisdiction." Id. para. 47.
132. Id. at 111, para. 5.

